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I.CONTESTINGCOMMUNITY:THEREFUGEEASASITEOFTENSION
Writing in the mid-twentieth century with the horrors of the Second World War still close at hand,HannahArendtnotedthattheemergenceofstatelesspersonsasthe"mostsymptomatic group in contemporary politics" served as both a catalytic factor in the emergence of totalitarianism and as a lasting crisis of the post-totalitarian world. Of course, since Arendt pennedherfarsightedobservations,theoftreferredto'humanitarianproblem'thatrefugeesand stateless persons have been seen to pose has only become far more ubiquitous, with over 17 million people classified as refugees and displaced persons to date. 1 Moreover, alongside the equally pressing international issues of immigration and humanitarian intervention, the questionsposedbythephenomenaofwidespreadstatelessnesshasonlyintensifiedthedegree to which commitments to universal human rights and the sovereign claims of political communities have been seen to clash, thereby complicating discussions of global justice and theemerginginternationallegalnormsofourincreasinglyinterconnectedpresent.Indeed,for ourmodernparadigmofhumanrightsthathasbeenphilosophicallyadvancedonuniversalistic grounds, and yet linked to the incorporation of such rights into national institutions and law, the refugee appears as a figure both least protected and most vulnerable under present internationalarrangements.
Yet despite the apparent challenges the position of the refugee appears to offer toward our contemporary understandings of citizenship and human rights, the issue of statelessness has receivedrelativelylittlesustainedattentionwithindiscussionsofinternationaljustice.Inmany waysitappearsasifthegeneralconsensusviewsstatelessnessasastatusfartooexceptional, andthereforeperipheral,tomeritdirectconcern.Itisbecauseofthisgeneraltrendthatthis paperattemptsinparttoreorientnormativepoliticaltheorytotheparticularquandariesand * Doctoralcandidate,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofToronto.
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1 Giventhatthereisanobviouspoliticaldimensiontotheclassificationofindividualsasrefugees,itisworthnoting thattheUNFPAestimatesthatthereareover190millionimmigrantsworldwide. 4CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL. 06NO.02 issuesraisedbystatelessness.Thisisbecause,asIhopetoindicateherein,aninattentiveness to the position of the refugee often distorts or clouds discussions of international obligations and human rights, allowing us to gloss over the underlying inconsistencies in our prevailing understandingsofinternationalorderandglobaljustice.Acentralexampleofthis"blindspot" incontemporarypoliticaltheoryisfoundinthelaterworkoftheseminalpoliticaltheoristJohn Rawls.InhisTheLawofPeoples,anattempttoworkoutatheoryofjusticeforinternational relations, Rawls entirely elides the ethical and political issues raised by immigration and statelessness-problematically articulating a vision of interstate relations that puts the imperatives of self-determination and human rights in stark conflict. In this way, Rawls' inattentivenesstothecontingenciesofcitizenshipisemblematicoftherefusaltorecognizethe articulationofthebasisandboundsofcommunitymembershipasacentralpoliticalquestion. Moreover,asmuchofthecriticalreceptionofTheLawofPeopleshassuggested,theproblems raisedbysuchissuescanonlybeneglectedatthecostofconsiderableconceptualpoverty.
With the above considerations in mind, this paper will attempt to provide a provisional engagement with the particular issues raised by the position of the refugee and, more generally,tosuggestthatthequestionsofstatelessnessshouldoccupyafarmorecentralplace in the considerations of normative political theory. In doing so, I will attempt to address whether,andifsohow,ourconceptionsofcommunityandcitizenshipshouldbetransfigured onaccountoftheparticulartheoreticalandethicalconcernsraisedbystatelessness.Thefirst sectionwillofferanaccountoftheproblematicstatusoftherefugeebyengagingwiththework ofHannahArendttoindicatehowthephenomenaofstatelessnessrevealshiddentensionsin ourconceptionsofpoliticalmembershipanduniversalhumanrights.Arendt'sincisiveanalysis brings to light the precarious position of the refugee as located out of the bounds of community, while also highlighting the particular dilemmas that any approach toward statelessness will have to address. The second section will shift focus from a diagnostic to a prescriptive dimension, by turning to the approach of discourse ethics offered in Jurgen Habermas' work as a potential means to theorize the issues raised by statelessness and the question of the claim or right to community. As will become clear, the approach offered by Habermas' is suggestive of novel ways of negotiating and transforming our conceptions of political membership toward a more just and cosmopolitan conception. However, while the paradigmofdiscourseethicsprovidesapromisingframework,Iwillsuggestthatthisapproach is in need of a supplementary orientation toward openness, given that the question of statelessness has at its very core the problematic of inclusion. In addressing this more fundamentaldimensionofthequestionofinclusion,Ishallturntotheworkandinsightsofthe contemporary theorists of agonistic democracy William Connolly and Chantal Mouffe. As will becomeclear,thefocusofthesetheoristsonthecontestabilityoftermsandthefundamentally unsettled nature of the political provide resources for conceptualizing more open notions of politicalmembership.Thepaperwillconcludebysuggestinghowtheapproachesofdiscourse ethicsandagnostictheorycanbeusedtoimagineformationsofcommunitythateschewthe typesofexclusioncentraltotheproductionofstatelessness.
II.THEPROBLEMATICOFSTATELESSNESS:SOVEREIGNTYANDHUMANRIGHTS
Having established our trajectory of analysis, our engagement with the issue of statelessness willbeginbyturningtotheworkofHannahArendt.Herthoughtoffersauniqueperspectiveon our contemporary historical situation that importantly challenges our orientation toward the relationship of human rights and citizenship, providing a remarkable vantage point from which to considersuchproblemsanew.Arguably,thefigureoftherefugeeiscentraltoArendt'sconcerns regarding our forms of modern politics and community, in part driving her critical analysis in bothTheOriginsofTotalitarianismandTheHumanCondition.However,itisintheformerwork thatthesituationoftherefugeeisgivenmostexplicittreatment,anditistoArendt'sanalysisof the emergence of mass statelessness that I shall now turn to in order to briefly explicate the problematicconcernsraisedbysuchphenomena.
As a project, The Origins of Totalitarianism represents Arendt's attempt to understand the historically unprecedented emergence of totalitarianism in the 20th Century through an extensivestudyofthediffuseconditionsunderwhichitarose.Inherstudy,Arendtspecifically identifies the emergence of widespread statelessness-the rendering of masses of people as rightlessanduprooted-asoneamongmanyconditionsthatmadepossiblethehorrorsoftotal domination in the modern world. Indeed, with the appearance of the refugee or stateless person as a pervasive phenomenon, many of the previously submerged dangers and contradictions of thenation-statesystem cameto thefore-perhapsmostimportantly in the conceptualandpracticalcrisisinherentinthenotionofinalienableuniversalhumanrights.In her discussion subtitled "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man" Arendt offers a consideration of the phenomena of widespread statelessness during the interwarerathatdelineatesherviewsofthecrucialimplicationsofsuchdevelopments. AsIhavetriedtoemphasizeabove,thephenomenaofstatelessnessisfundamentallytiedto the tension we find between the universalizing impulse of human rights discourse and the limitations imposed by our current understandings of citizenship and the state. As the sociologist Saskia Sassen has noted of the developments of the inter-war era, "the emergent interstate system was the key to the creation of the stateless person, the identification of refugees as such, and their regulation or control." 5 Indeed, perhaps what is most remarkable about Arendt's insights is how pertinent they remain for our contemporary situation. The primaryinternationalresponsetotheissuesposedbystatelessnesshasbeentheconstitution ofintergovernmentalorganizationsresponsibleforoverseeingtheconditionofrefugees-but these institutions are themselves symptomatic of the only intensified pervasiveness of statelessnesswithintheworld.Moreover,despitethepresenceofemergingnormsconcerning the question of humanitarian intervention, in which sovereignty has become understood as contingentuponthestate'sresponsibilitytoprotect, 6 normsregardingthepositionofrefugees andasylumseekershavebecomeonlymoreambiguousinrelationtotheprerogativesofraison d'etat.Threeremarkable,thoughbynomeansisolated,recentillustrationsoftheunresolved natureofthesetensionsclearlyindicatethecruciallimitationsofmodernhumanrightsnorms fordealingwithsuchissues.Thefirsthasbeenthe2001-2008PacificSolutionoftheAustralian government, under which a system of offshore detention centers were established for individualsenteringthecountrywithoutvalidpapersinordertoprovidegreaterdiscretionin the evaluation of asylum seekers without violating the human rights norms that come into effectwithlandedstatus.Suchasystem,whichlivedoninthecountry'smandatorydetention policy, led to the pervasive long-term incarceration of asylum seekers and refugees. 7 The secondnotablecaseistobefoundintheinterveningstagesoftheBritishBelmarshdecisionof 2004whichallowedtheUKgovernmenttodetainindefinitelynon-citizenswhowouldnormally face deportation, but who could not be deported without derogation from human rights 4 HannahArendt,TheHumanCondition(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1958),176. obligations because of the risk they face of being tortured in their country of origin. 8 The paradoxical outcome of this situation was the legalization of indefinite incarceration without trialfornon-citizensundertheaegisofconformingtohumanrightsnorms.Moreremarkable, atjustthemomentwheninstitutionalinnovationssuchastheSchengenagreementinEurope arebeginningtosupposedlyde-territorializestatesandbreakdownborders,"detentioncamps for foreigners have mushroomed across the European Union" with experiments with the externalizationofbordersalongthelinesofthe'PacificSolution'alreadybeginningtotakeform through multilateral agreements with bordering states.
Arendt
9 While these cases provide extreme examplesoftheconflictbetweenhumanrightsnormsandstatesovereigntywithinthepolicies of advanced industrial democracies, they are merely emblematic of general contradictory featuresofourinternationalsystem.Civilwars,naturaldisasters,widespreadpovertyandfailed states, amid a world of only tightening borders have only increased the number of people caughtbetweentheintersticesofourinternationalorder.
Iwouldcontend,alongwithArendt,thattheunderlyingsourceofourcontemporaryinabilityto manage these pathologies of the nation state system lie in the exclusionary nature of our currentformsofcitizenshipandourinabilitytorecognizethefundamentalnatureoftheright tobelongtoacommunity.Indeed,whatisperhapsmostremarkableaboutourcurrenteraof globalization is that, with supposedly growing mobility and interconnectedness across the world,theabilityofhumanpersonstomoveacrossborderswouldpaleincomparisontothatof internationaltradeandmonetaryexchange.Thecostsofthiscontradictorylogicareofcourse born heavily by those who find themselves on the outside of states, or as the 'others' of the citizenswithinnations.ButwhileArendt'sworkbringstotheforetheuntenablenatureofour currentconceptionsofcommunityandthefundamentallimitationsofhumanrightsdiscourse, herinsightfulanalysisprovidesuswithonlyaproblematizationoftheissuesathand.
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III.DISCOURSEETHICSANDTHERIGHTTOBELONG:
Having provided a provisional sketch of the problematic conceptual challenges raised by the phenomenaofstatelessness,Iwouldnowliketoturntothetheoreticalapproachtowardthese issuesthatcanbearticulatedthroughanengagementwithHabermas'work,inparticularthe modeofphilosophicaljustificationhehasdevelopedundertherubricofdiscourseethics.The salienceofHabermas'thoughtforaddressingtheconceptualproblemsofstatelessnessraised initially by Arendt is suggested by the critical edge discourse ethics potentially offers for interrogating and dislodging the presuppositions that currently underpin our exclusionary conceptionsof'belonging'necessarytotheproductionofstatelessness.Indeed,inthewaythey areentwinedwiththeideasofcommunity,citizenshipandhumanrights,theissuesofinclusion raisedbystatelessnessseemtobeintimatelytiedto"questionshavingtodowiththegrammar offormsoflife"inourlatemodernera.
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Moreoverthebroaderfocusofhislargerprojectof the theory of communicative action, with its focus on intersubjective engagement and attentiveness to the distorting effects of power relations, further confirm the promise of appealingtohisworkwithinthecontextofourpresentdiscussion.
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In taking up Habermas' approach of discourse ethics for the issue of statelessness, I will interpret Habermas as a post-metaphysical, non-foundationalist theorist. 13 Based on this reading,Isuggestthepromiseofhisapproachliesinprovidingaconceptualizationoftheissues raisedbystatelessnessandcitizenshipwithouthavingtorelyuponproblematicphilosophicalor metaphysical assumptions that often seem to underpin our understanding of human rights. Given the cautionary warning that Arendt's analysis offers regarding the fragility of such premises,atheoreticalcommitmenttonon-foundationalisminourconceptualapproachseems mostprudentandpromising.Granted,thisreadingofHabermasaseschewingfoundationalism inhisapproachtocommunicativeactionissomewhatcomplicatedbyhisapparentessentialism regarding the nature of language as having as its "inherent telos" the reaching of mutual understanding.
14 However the apparent import of such accusations of a hidden foundationalism are themselves seemingly overstated. 15 Moreover, regardless of whether we are fully sanctioned in interpreting Habermas' theoretical commitments in this way, I believe wecaneasilytakeuphispositionwhilestillacknowledgingthathisaccountoflanguagemay merely have the status of, to use Connolly's phrase, "premises deeply rooted in modernity Theweakeningof the cognitivist commitments of Habermas' approach and the consequent limiting of the transcendentalscopeofdiscourseethicsto"giveupanyclaimto'ultimatejustification'"isitself consistentwithunderstandingofnormsthatHabermasattributestothepost-conventionalera ofmodernity. 21 Theapproachofdiscourseethicsisthereforebestunderstoodastheworking out of implications of his conception of communicative rationality in relation to claims of normative validity and moral legitimacy. As Thomas McCarthy notes, for Habermas the elaboration of the principles of ethics justification "begins with a reflective turn, for these principles are built into the very structure of practical discourse itself."
22
Therefore it is the model of argumentative discourse that provides the principle of discourse ethics, that "only thosenormscanclaimtobevalidthatmeet(orcouldmeet)withtheapprovalofallaffectedin their capacity as participants in a practical discourse." therefore stipulates the intersubjective condition under which a norm can be justified as expressingthecommonwillofthepluralityofthosewhowillbeeffected.
Before turning toward the application of discourse ethics within our current context, it is importanttonotetherelationofHabermas'approachtothetraditionofKantianmoraltheory, if only to stress its crucial divergences. As a deontological approach, Kant's monistic oriented moraltheoryattemptstoavoidtheissueofconflictingobligationsbyclaimingtoshowthatthe categoricalimperativeitselfisadequateasamoralstandardforvalidatingnormsormaxims.In thiswaytheHabermassianapproachcanbeseenasanextensionoftheKantiantraditionwith notablemodifications:therejectionofthemetaphysicaldivisionoftheworldintothenominal and the phenomenal realm, and the insistence on a dialogical basis for moral consciousness. ForHabermasthecriteriais,contraKant,notwhattheindividualcanwillwithoutcontradiction, butwhatallaffectedpartiescanagreetoinrationallygroundeddiscourse.KeytoHabermas' approach is the way he construes the universalizing dimension of moral discourse in a decentered fashion. Hence the criteria of impartiality for discourse ethics, taken from the suppositions of everyday communication, is captured in the principle of universalism for the validityofeverynorm,suchthat:"Allaffectedcanaccepttheconsequencesandthesideeffects itsgeneralobservancecanbeanticipatedtohaveforthesatisfactionofeveryone'sinterests." 24 This is because Habermas identifies the fault in Kantian approaches to the principle of universalization as lying in the reliance on the orientation of a subject-centered perspective. Suchapproachesfailtofullyacknowledgethat"validnormsmustdeserverecognitionfromall concerned"andinsteadpresentsaconceptionofmoralnormsinwhichthe"processofjudging is relative to the vantage point and perspective of some and not all concerned." 25 Moreover, Habermas'approachopenlyacknowledgesthesituatednatureoftheparticipantstodiscourse, andthereforeattemptstoavoidthemonologicalandtranscendentaldimensionsoftheKantian tradition. As Habermas writes: "Discourses take place in particular social contexts and are subject to the limitations of time and space…their participants are not Kant's intelligible charactersbutrealhumanbeings."
26 Inalternativelyproposingaprinciplethat"constrainsall affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the balance of interests" one can read Habermas as following up on the Hegelian critique of the 'abstract universal' of Kantian morality that had initially suggested an attentiveness to the inter-subjective dimension of interaction so central to the overall project of communicative action. 27 Within the domain of our concerns over the question of inclusion, this aspect of Habermas' theory importantly tethers the approach of discourse ethics and grounds the criteria of the inter-subjective validationofnormsinthesituatednatureofparticipants.
Inturningtotheevaluationofthenormsunderlyingtheprerogativesofnationalterritoryand statesovereignty,weshouldbeginbybrieflydrawingattentiontotheimplicitformsofethical justification that underwrite our contemporary understandings of citizenship and national communities.Theclaimsofmodernstatestoexercisecontrolovertheirbordersanddefinethe limitsofcommunitymembershipextendfromthelogicofself-determination-itselfrootedin theideaofdemocraticlegitimacyandpopularsovereignty.
28 Thebasisofthisunderstandingof self-determination is put succinctly by Michael Walzer in his description of the state as "constitutedbytheunionofpeopleandgovernment,anditisthestatethatclaimsagainstall otherstatesthetwinrightsofterritorialintegrityandpoliticalsovereignty."
29 Underthismode ofjustification,theprerogativesofterritorialcontrolandthedemarcationofcitizenshipstem from the right of a nation or people to determine the structure and form of their mode of collectivelife.Inthissense,itisbyappealtotheclaimofself-determinationthattheexclusion of the asylum seeker and refugee are purportedly legitimated by the traditional norms of nationalsovereignty.Moreover,fromthestandpointofcitizenship,onemightinferthatpartof themoraljustificationoftheboundednatureofstateswouldhavetobetiedupwiththeclaim of all to membership. In this sense, the claim to community, which must clearly imply the exclusion of those outside the boundaries of such a group, is supposedly redeemed by the expectationthatthosewithouthaverecoursetotheirownformsofself-determiningpolitical membership. At least as much seems to be implied in the somewhat euphemistic term of 'displaced persons'-as if the issues posed by statelessness were merely the products of disturbances of the interstate system, rather then symptomatic of deeper problems. 30 However,inthiscontextitiscrucialtonotethatinunderstandingtheclaimtocommunityas bothanormativeandamoraldemand,weneedtorecognizethattheuniversalizingdimension ofsuchanappealmustbedirectedbothtothosewithinandthoseoutsideparticularpolities. But as we have seen in our earlier interrogation of the relation of citizenship to the state, the productionofrefugeesseemstobeinherentinthelogicofourcontemporaryformsofcommunity. How are we to reconcile the status of the modern state as the underlying source of the crisis of statelessness,andastheonlymeansbywhicha'righttohaverights'maybesecured?
Having laid out in broad outline the current structure of presumptions that underwrite our contemporary understanding of citizenship and polity, it should be apparent that the frameworkofdiscourseethicsforcesustore-evaluatethelegitimacyofsuchnorms.Fromthe Onthis,seeGoodwin-Gill'sdiscussionofthepostwarre-emergenceofthetermdisplacedperson,anditsinitial useasasurrogateforwhatwereessentiallyrefugeesoftheconflictinIndo-china.
GuyGoodwin-Gill,TheRefugeeinInternationalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),11-13. impartialandinclusiveperspectivesuggestedbydiscourseethics,thenormativeprivilegingof thepositionofthecitizencannotsimplybepresumed,whilethesovereignprerogativesofthe state to control entrance and limit citizenship are now in need of substantial justification. In asking us to consider whether our current norms of citizenship and sovereignty would be accepted by all those effected by such norms, we must clearly take into consideration the position of those who are most disadvantaged by such institutions and who find themselves asymmetricallylocatedinrelationtocitizens-thatis,attheperipheryoroutsidetheboundsof inclusion. In this appropriation of discourse ethics, normative justification cannot be merely circumscribedtotheconcernsofthosewithinpoliticalcommunities,butmustcometoaccount for those without. Moreover, while our reading of Arendt brought to the fore the factors producing statelessness at its emergence as a mass phenomenon, at our current historical juncturetheclaimstovalidityofsuchnormshaveonlybecomemoreproblematicastheidea and integrity of the nation state has itself become conceptually dubious. The question that discourse ethics asks us to raise is whether the norms of sovereignty and self-determination that allow individual states to set the criteria of entrance and control the distribution of citizenshipcanbefullyjustifiedwhentheperspectiveoftherefugeeistakenintoaccount.Ina sense,theissueofwhetherthenumberofclaimantswhofulfillthequalificationsforthestatus of asylum seekers or refugees are actually admitted by states that claim to adhere to human rights is actually secondary for our current considerations. From the perspective of discourse ethics,therealquestioniswhethersuchstringentandexclusionarycriteriacanbejustifiedat all.
When taking into consideration the perspective of those caught in between communities or who find themselves admitted under a precarious or illicit status-asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants-we have good reason to doubt the acceptability of contemporary norms of citizenshipandterritorialsovereignty.Indeed,ifourforegoinganalysisiscorrectinsuggestinga fundamental relation between our current modalities of community and citizenship with the practices of exclusion that produce stateless, we have good reason to believe that a moral imperativeexistsforweakeningtheboundariesofstatesandliberalizingthemeansofgaining membership within communities. While still allowing for the values of cultural integrity and communal life, a consideration of the question of inclusion from the position of all those affected by the exclusionary norms of membership will clearly push us to take up a more cosmopolitanperspective.Oneformthismighttakeisintherecognitionofafundamentalright toclaimcitizenshipwithinapolity-withtheburdenofproofagainstsuchaclaimlyingonthe part of the state. The development and articulation of such a right to belong would not necessarilybeincompatiblewithsomeformsofcommunalintegrity.Howeversuchclaimswill have to be justified in relation to the claims of those outside of a particular state, and not simplydecidedinadvancebythepresumptivebiasofthenationalinterest.
AsIhavetriedtoindicateintheforegoingdiscussion,theapproachofdiscourseethicswhen universally applied to the realm of those affected by our contemporary norms of citizenship andsovereigntyforcesustoreconsiderthecontoursofourcurrentpractices.However,Iwould alsoliketosuggestthattheformaldimensionsofdiscourseethicsraisecertainissuesforour attempt to address the particular concerns brought to the fore by statelessness and point to 14CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL.06NO.02 thelimitationsthatsuchanengagementwillhavetoovercome.AsHabermashimselfnotesof his approach, the principle of discourse ethics is procedural rather then substantive in form, makingreferencetothediscursiveprocessoftheevaluationofnormativeclaimstovalidity.As hewrites:
To this extent discourse ethics can properly be characterized as formal…Practical discourse is notaprocedureforgeneratingjustifiednormsbutaprocedurefortestingthevalidityofnorms thatarebeingproposedandhypotheticallyconsideredforadoption.Thatmeansthatpractical discoursesdependoncontentbroughttothemfromtheoutside. 31 Thus,muchliketheKantianconceptionofmoralitybasedonthecategoricalimperativethatit aims to supercede, discourse ethics itself is not aimed at the generation of moral norms, but rather offers a way of evaluating and potentially legitimating norms that are brought into question.Howeveraswehavenotedabove,unlikethemonologicaldimensionoftheKantian approach, Habermas explicitly constructs discourse ethics around a communicative model, thereby explicitly emphasizing the dimension of inter-subjective agreement between a community of participants. Yet the very virtue of discourse ethics in attempting to base the validation of norms in the actual participation of concrete agents in practical discourse itself raises questions about how the realm of participants is constituted. As Habermas notes, the very idea of practical discourse is dependent on a "horizon provided by the lifeworld of a specific social group…" and thereby tied to particularized conceptions of community. 32 Moreover,theverymeansinwhichthenorminquestionisitselfconceptualized-amatterof economics,ofimmigration,ofhumanrights-seemstoradicallyshiftoursenseofthescopeof relevantparticipants,andindeedpointstothequestionofhowthoseboundsarethemselves politically constituted. An instructive example of this is the gradual shift we have seen in the past few decades in the refugee policies of many Western industrial democracies. Arguably, there has been a widespread move in policy away from conceptualizing such issues as concerning human rights, and toward treating the claims of refugees and asylum seekers primarily as an immigration question. Such trends are exemplified more recently in the emergenceofpoliciesdesignedtodeflectclaimantswithoutviolatinginternationalobligations, such as the Safe Third Country Agreement between the United States and Canada. 33 These developmentsofcourseimplythenormativeprivilegingofthepositionofcitizensbymorefully excludingpotentialclaimantsthemselvesfromtherealmofpartieswhoseviewsandpositions arefullyrelevanttotheformulationofpolicy.Suchissuesonlyhighlightthepossibledifficulties inaddressingwhatitwouldmeantohavestatelesspersonsplayaroleintheadjudicationof the norms that would secure their inclusion in the first place. The potentiality of discourse ethics to validate new and intrinsically open forms of community is clear from our earlier discussion, but from our contemporary standpoint we seem terribly far from having adopted the "enlarged mentality" that the implementation of such considerations would seem to demand.Moreover,therootednessofourfundamentalconceptionsofdemocraticlegitimacy intheideaofboundedcommunitiesmakestheleaptothestandpointof'citizenoftheworld,' or even to a post-national consciousness, seemingly rather distant. This suggests that addressing the issue of statelessness in the present requires that we direct our attention toward problematizing the very notions of citizen and 'people' that seemingly necessitate politicalclosure.
IV.THEORIZINGTHECONTINGENCYANDCONTESTABILITYOFCOMMUNITY:
Havingdrawnattentiontothepotentialandlimitsofdiscourseethicstopointthewaytoward more inclusive understandings of community and citizenship, we will now engage with the emergentperspectiveofagonisticdemocratictheoristsinordertosuggestwaysinwhichthe ideaofa'people'itselfcanbeunderstoodasintrinsicallyopen.Asindicatedabove,thecentral dilemmafacingourattempttoovercometheissuesposedbystatelessnessisthattheposition of the refugee is itself one of exclusion and in a sense constitutes a form of identity which seeminglyeludessolidarity.Thereforeanyattempttoovercometheparticularchallengesposed bystatelessnessandtheattempttoarticulateafundamentalrighttobelongtocommunitywill cruciallyhavetounderwritethemodesofinclusionnecessarytobringthosewhofalloutsideof thecommunitywithinthethresholdoftherelevant.Itiswiththisaiminmindthatweturnto writerssuchasWilliamConnollyandChantalMouffe,whohavehelpeddevelopandarticulate the agonistic approach toward democratic theory that places the issues of conflict and contestation at the center of the political. Using their insights I will further develop our engagementwiththeissueofstatelessnessalongthreedimensions:theunsettlednatureofour concepts of citizen and 'people,' the constitutive tension between liberalism and democracy, andthepotentialityformoreinclusiveandopennotionsofcommunitythattheagonisticvision ofpoliticssuggests.Theseconsiderationswillbringtolighthowweshouldunderstandthebasis and bounds of community as always inherently contingent, and therefore help cultivate the orientationnecessarytobeattentivetotheneedsofthoseexcluded.
Beforebeginningourengagementwiththeworkoftheaforementionedtheorists'itseemsbest to briefly address and diffuse the apparent opposition that such perspectives have been claimed to have with the approach of deliberative democracy that Habermas' work is associated with. Given the often emphasized challenge that the agonistic conception of democratic politics claims to pose to the approach toward radical democracy stemming from thecriticaltheoryofHabermas,theattempttosupplementourunderstandingoftheissueof statelessness by turning to both traditions is in need of some explanation. Thus, perhaps most importantly for our purposes, Connolly's work highlights the political dimensionoflanguageitselfinwaysthatenableustotrackpotentialopportunitiesforpolitical innovation by allowing us to "expose conceptual closure when it has been imposed artificially." 41 Inthisway,whatConnolly'sanalysisforcesustoconfrontisthecontinuallypartial and incomplete nature of our core political concepts. This suggests that the extension and meaningofsuchconceptsascommunityandcitizenshipcanneverbesaidtobefullydecided, while our understandings of such central ideas as 'justice' at any specific moment are to be understood as always the conception of a particular group and therefore always open to contestation and further negotiation. In this way, distancing ourselves from the approach towardoursocialworldthattreatssuchquestionsasstaticand'operationalizable'allowsusto see that our central concepts are not anymore settled than the actual communities within whichwelive. Whatisatagivenmomentconsideredthe'naturalorder'-jointlywiththe'commonsense' whichaccompaniesit-istheresultofsedimentedpractices;itisneverthemanifestationofa deeperobjectivityexteriortothepracticesthatbringitintobeing. 43 Placingthisdimensionofcontestabilityatthecenterofourthinkingaboutcitizenshiptherefore helps us keep in mind the inherent contingency to any idea of a 'people' and allows us to cultivateasenseofsolidaritywiththoseoutsideourparticularformofcommunitybyviewing themalwaysaspotentialcitizenswithlegitimateclaimstoourconcern.
Connolly
Havingofferedanaccountofhowthevalenceofcontestabilitycanbegintoorientustoward intrinsicallymoreopenconceptionsofcommunity,Iwouldliketonowattendtotheelements ofthetraditionofagonistictheorythatemphasisthecentralroleofconflictandantagonismto therealmofthepoliticalmoregenerally.MuchlikeConnolly,theworkofMouffealsocenters around the radical potentiality of a conception of politics that emphasizes the value of contestation for forestalling the threat of closure that seemingly haunts our democratic practices.However,Mouffeinparticularcarriesthethematicofcontestationtotheextremein order to argue for the irreducibility and ineliminability of the potential for antagonism within thedomainofthepolitical.Mouffe'santagonisticconceptionofpoliticsisinpartindebtedtoa tempered engagement with the work of Carl Schmitt that draws off his insistence on the fundamentally "conflictual nature of politics" and the importance of recognizing the antagonisticandrelationalbasisofidentity,whilerejectinghisinsistenceonthe"existenceofa homogenousdemos." 44 AccordingtoMouffe,thisrevisedvisionofpoliticscenteredaroundthe ever-present possibility of conflict is both more in tune with the oppositional foundation of identity and more open to the potentials for radical challenge and transformation that democracyallows. WithinMouffe'sinterpretationofmoderndemocracy,ourfundamentalframeworkofpolitical activityisstructuredbytheparadoxicaltensionbetweendemocracyasaformofruleandthe symbolic framework of legalism, rights, and equality, that characterizes liberalism. 45 Drawing offtheinsightsofSchmitt'scritiqueoftheliberalunderstandingofpoliticswhilerejectinghis dismissal of liberalism, Mouffe emphasizes how this 'democratic paradox' between the two componentsofourmodernframeworkofpoliticsleadstoapermanentsiteoftension,for"no final resolution between these two conflicting logics is possible" with our options limited to onlyprecariousandtemporarynegotiationsofthisdivide. 46 Morefundamentally,wecanread Mouffe's identification of the conflicting logic of liberal democracy as part of the deeper tensionbetweenlegalityandthesovereignwillofthedemos.Thesignatureofthisconflictruns like a red thread through the history of political theory. Emblematic of this are Aristotle's discussions in the Politics of the tension between the will of the people and the laws of the polity,aswellasRousseau'sopaqueconsiderationsonhowtoresolvethattensioninaperiod atwhichliberalismwasmoreanascenttheorythananestablishedtradition. 47 YetMouffedoes helpfullyflaghowthistensionisitselfdeepenedbytheadventofliberalismanditsemphasison equalityandrightsdiscourse.AsMouffenotes:
By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-exclusion implied by the political constitution of the 'people'-required by the exercise of democracy-the liberal discourse of universal human rights plays an important role in maintaining the democratic contestation alive.Ontheotherside,itisonlythankstothedemocraticlogicsofequivalencethatfrontiers can be created and a demos established without which no real exercise of rights would be possible. 48 Bydramatizingthesiteofliberaldemocracyascontingentandunstable,heranalysisbringsto the fore the radically precarious and problematic dimension of any attempt to permanently articulate more inclusive and open conceptions of community. Moreover, Mouffe's warning regardingthefragilityofanyparticularpoliticalconfigurationisexceedinglyaptinourcurrent ageofthe'waronterror'whenthecivilrightsofcitizens,letalonethoseofresidentaliensand non-nationals, have been notably eroded under more or less democratic institutions. As she notes of political negotiations in general, "every order is the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices"-a point that emphasizes the provisional and limited characterofanypolitical'solution.' 49 theagonisticperspectivepointtotheneedtofosterlocalpotentialitiesofcommunityinways that may allow us to transcend the problematic bounds of the state and build the forms of solidarity necessary for more inclusive orientations of citizenship. While such potentialities remain fragmentary and uncertain at present, such experiments in developing alternative practicesofcitizenshipwillhavetoplayacentralroleinanypracticalattempttograpplewith theissuesraisedbystatelessness.
